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NOTES
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN "DISABLING" AND
"ENABLING" PARADIGMS IN LAW:
STERILIZATION, THE DEVELOPMENTALLY
DISABLED, AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned
judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But in
the everyday business of living... these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot
be altogether parted in law more than in life.1
Although America has recorded great progress in the area of disability during the past few decades, our society is still infected by
the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people
with disabilities are less than fully human... the result is massive,
2
society-wide discrimination.
INTRODUCnON

Traditionally, the law's policy regarding individuals with developmental disabilities has been one of pessimism.3 It has sought to
lessen the social impact of their disabilities through remedial measI

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
The Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Educationand the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
2

and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1989) (statement ofJustin Dart, Chairperson of the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities).
3 Many legislatures, courts, and health professionals now use the term "developmentally disabled" when referring to the mentally retarded. William A. Krais, Note, The
Incompetent Developmentally DisabledPerson's Right of Self-Determination:Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM.J.L. & MED. 333, 333 n.1 (1990). This Note uses the
terms "developmentally disabled" and "mentally disabled" interchangeably, with the
caveat that definitional problems may arise from this usage. For example, "[t]he American Association of Mental Deficiency defines mental retardation as 'subaverage general
intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior.'" Id. (citation ommitted). However, the
precise legal meaning of "developmental disability" may be considerably narrower. 42
U.S.C.A. § 6001(5) (West Supp. 1992) provides this definition:
The term "developmental disability" means a severe, chronic disability of
a person 5 years of age or older which(A) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments;
(B) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two;
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely;
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ures but has not generally assisted them in leading fuller, more
meaningful lives. 4 Within the last few decades, however, there has
been a perceptible change in the law's approach to developmental
disability; the underlying policy has shifted from negative expectation to "normalization." 5 This new approach is based on clinical
6
psychology's changing conception of developmental disability,
from a treatment paradigm focused on the "different" needs of the
disabled 7 to one that, in theory at least, assumes that their disabili8
ties are more dynamic and flexible than was previously thought.
The social ramifications of this shift are unclear, but its legal
consequences are already visible. Congress and state legislatures
have taken increasingly active roles in encouraging the normalization of the disabled, as witnessed by a proliferation of statutory
(D) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of
the following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (ii) receptive
and expressive language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direction, (vi) capacity for independent living, and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; and
(E) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of
special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually
planned and coordinated ....
Id.; see Philip Roos, The Law and Mentally Retarded People: An Uncertain Future 31 STAN. L.
REV. 613 (1979); Deborah H. Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled Shedding
Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 599 (1981).
4
See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions ofJustice: Law, Politics,and the Mentally Retarded Parent 103 HARv. L. REV. 1201 (1990).
5 Recognizing that treating retarded people as "deviant" only reinforces
"deviant" behavior, many leaders in the field of mental retardation have
urged that retarded people be treated as much as possible like normal
people, that they be afforded "patterns and conditions of everyday life
which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society."
Roos, supra note 4, at 613-14 (citation omitted). Normalization was first seen as an end
in itself, but more recently has been invoked as a means of fostering normative behavior.
See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Mental Retardationand Society: The Ethics and Politics of
Normalization, 93 ETHICS 81 (1982) (discussing the political and clinical foundations of
"normalization" policy and the difficulty of putting it into practical effect).
6
Recognition of the receptivity of many mentally disabled persons to education
and training has formed the basis for the most recent response model, the developmental approach. First articulated in the 1960s, this approach has made tremendous inroads
into the traditional methods of dealing with mental disability. The emphasis of this approach is on teaching and training the disabled, thus allowing them to acheive their full
developmental potential. SamuelJ. Brakel, Historical Trends, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 9, 17 (SamuelJ. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
7
See Philip Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1 LAw &
PSYCHOL. REV. 45 (1975).
8 See, e.g.,JANE R. MERCER, LABELING THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1973); William G.
Bronston, Concepts and Theory of Normalization, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD AND
His FAMILY 490 (Richard Koch &James C. Dobson eds., rev. ed. 1976); Roos, supra note
3; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5.
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schemes prohibiting discrimination against them. 9 With the passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 10 the stage is
set for society-wide implementation of the normalization programyet the question remains whether the legal implementation of this
program will have any significant social impact. 1 An important aspect of this question is how the new body of law implementing normalization policies will affect traditional legal conceptions of
disability.12
This Note suggests that alternative policies concerning the developmentally disabled conflict in an area of law that has traditionally been rife with prejudice: involuntary sterilization.' 3 Part I of
this Note discusses the changing therapeutic and legal approaches
to disability. 14 Crudely speaking, the clinical paradigm has gone
from a "natural" to a "nurtural" interpretation of disability' 5-la16
belled herein, respectively, "disabling" and "enabling" paradigms
of disability.' 7 Along with a shift in the clinical approach to disabil9 See e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988); Education of
the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992). In addition, 34 states have enacted
their own anti-discrimination statutes. See John Parry, Rights and Entitlements in the Community, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 6, at 687-88.
10 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
11 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Discriminationand Disability: The Challenges of the ADA,
18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 340 (1990) ("[The ADA] is a monumental bill that
goes far in new directions. But it does not complete the voyage.").
12 See generally Hayman, supra note 4, at 1210 ("[Laws seeking to minimize the damage mentally retarded persons cause to society] are nearly always inconsistent with
measures designed to eliminate the impacts of socio-political prejudice.").
13
This Note will focus on involuntary sterilization as authorized by statute. Very
broadly, involuntary sterilization statutes authorize the sterilization of mentally retarded
or generally incompetent persons without their consent. Cf Barbara A. Burnett, Voluntary Sterilizationfor Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Need for Legislation, 32 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 913, 914 (1981) ("Where informed consent of the patient cannot be obtained or
may be compromised, some provision for substituted consent must be made if the procedure is to be performed.").
For historical accounts of involuntary sterilizations, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. &
Marcia P. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
HandicappedPersons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No
Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
14
Cf. MICHAEL WERTHEIMER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (1970) (discussing
the emergence and growth of experimentalism in psychology); Philip Roos & Brian M.
McCann, Major Trends in Mental Retardation,6 INT'LJ. MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1977) (discussing changing paradigms of mental disability).
15 The use of these rather well-worn terms represents the shift in prevailing therapeutic approaches, a shift that emphasizes deinstitutionalization and community-based
systems of support and treatment. For discussion, see WOLF WOLFENSBERGER ET AL.,
THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES (1972).
16 This term is used with all due respect to Thomas Kuhn, who formulated the
concept of "paradigm shifts" in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).

17 Although these terms have unavoidable political connotations, the use of "enabling" and "disabling" is normative and is meant to characterize the poles of scientific
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ity has come a shift in the legal approach-from a containment regime designed to administer services s to a normalization regime
constructed from statutory rights.1 9
Part II of this Note provides the legal and social history of involuntary sterilization in the United States as a means to regulate
the developmentally disabled's ability to reproduce. Currently, the
legal regulation of sterilization is undergoing a crisis of faith, 20 with
competing paradigms of disability creating tension in the law. This
tension results from widely varying levels of protection available for
the reproductive autonomy of developmentally disabled persons. 2 1
This Note then argues that the law's approach to sterilization of
the developmentally disabled should be enabling. Lawmakers intent on regulating the procreative ability of the disabled should be
wary of over-generalizations about what such persons can or cannot
do.22 Policies of normalization 23 and constitutional due process
24
protections on the fundamental right to "bear and beget a child"
mandate maximally protective sterilization statutes. These policies
and legal debate. The term "disabling paradigm" is not intended to suggest that holders of this view are responsible for the persistence of developmental disability and its
societal effects; likewise, holders of the enabling view do not banish disability by ineffable optimism. Adherents to the enabling view, however, are much more willing to believe that behaviorial modifications reinforced by law may alter the social effects of
disability in a positive way.
18 Actually, this approach is still the norm in many contexts. See, e.g., Hayman, supra
note 4, at 1210-11 (discussing "redemptive" measures in retardation law, which are
"designed to limit, rather than maximize, [the retarded's] niche in the social order").
19 See generally Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview, 1989
U. Iu.. L. REV. 923 (discussing the recently enacted statute prohibiting discrimination in
employment, public services, and public accomodations); Judith W. Wegner, The AntidiscriminationModel Reconsidered-Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under
Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984) (discussing the
growing body of law interpreting a federal statute prohibiting discrimination among recipients of federal funds).
20 See Burnett, supra note 13, at 916.
21 Id. at 924-25.
22 See Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L. REV. 943, 978 (1982) ("Especially at the
higher I.Q. end of the retardation spectrum, one might find individuals labeled retarded
who are capable of understanding the significance of sterilization .... [When individuals
can understand] the meaning of sterilization for themselves, we see no reason to deem
them incompetent to make the decision for themselves.").
23 See Roos, supra note 7, at 53
(One of the major concerns of many retarded persons is their desire to
'pass for normal,' but sterilization tends to interfere with this attempt,
particularly when the individual plans to marry. Hence it may well increase the retarded person's reluctance to join the 'mainstream of society' and to foster withdrawal and isolation.)
Id. (citation omitted). But see Burnett, supra note 13, at 923.
24
See Ross, supra note 3, at 609-30. See generally Rex Dunn, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A ConstitutionalRe-evaluation 14J. FAM. L. 280 (1975) (subjecting involuntary sterilization statutes to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection analysis).
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suggest that laws infringing on the developmentally disabled's procreative ability should do so only when necessary for their well25
being.
Unfortunately, minimally protective sterilization statutes were
upheld as constitutional decades ago in Buck v. Bell,2 6 an infamous
decision that seems unlikely to be overruled in the near future.
Thus, Part III of this Note suggests that the ADA2 7 should be used
to encourage the adoption of uniformly rigorous protections for developmentally
disabled
persons
against
state-mandated
28
sterilization.
I
A SHIFTING PARADIGM OF DISABILITY AND rrs LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES

A.

The "Disabling" Paradigm

Historically, the developmentally disabled have borne the brunt
of much fear and prejudice and have been singled out for special
treatment. 29 This treatment has varied from their enshrinement as
"holy innocents" 0 to systematic attempts to eradicate their propagation through forced sterilizations.8 ' However different the treatment, the underlying perception has remained consistent: the
developmentally disabled are fundamentally different from the rest
of society-so different that they cannot exist in the community

25 See Ross, supra note 3, at 635-37; Richard A. Estaco, Comment, Sterilization of the
Mentally Disabledin Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidanceare Enough, 92
DICK. L. REv. 409 (1988).

26

274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussion, see infra notes 87-100 and accompanying

text.

27
28
29

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
See infra part III.B.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1965) (discussing the phe-

nomenology of mental disability); see also Marie Appleby, Note, The Mentally Retarded:
The Needfor Intermnediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 109, 112-13 (1987) (discussing

the historical trend of misunderstanding mental retardation).
30 See Patricia Werner, Comment, Terminatingthe Rights of Mentally RetardedParents:
Severing the Ties that Bind, 22J. MARSHALL L. REV. 133, 137 (1988).
Depictions of the "holy innocent" stereotype are common in world literature, ranging from Prince Myshkin in FYODOR DosToYEvsKY, THE IDIOT (Constance Garnett trans.,
1913) to Ben Compton in WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE FURY (1929).
31 Forced sterilization of the developmentally disabled reached its height during

the 1930s in two modern industrial societies-Nazi Germany and the United States.
Similarities between their methods have been noted in James B. O'Hara & T. Howland
Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. LJ. 20, 31, 36-37 (1956).
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without assistance.3 2 Indeed, such persons are often deemed unable
33
to exist in the community at all.
Requirements of different treatment and the prevalence of negative expectations have led to a paradigm of disability that one may
label "disabling." 3 4 This paradigm reflects the presumption that
one who has been diagnosed as disabled in some important functional way is unable to live in the community as a normal person and
therefore must receive special treatment. This presumption may, in
many cases, be correct. Too often, however, it may serve as a selffulfilling prophecy, especially since those who employ it assume,
often without justification, that the retarded are irremediably differ5
ent from others.3
This presumption, combined with imperfectly understood principles of genetics 3 6 and advances in medical sterilization procedures,3 7 led to a brief period of popularity for eugenic sterilizations
in the early decades of this century.3 8 The premise behind eugenic
sterilization was a progressive, social Darwinistic desire to better the
human race through the sterilization of those with congenital and
behavioral abnormalities that were thought to be genetically transmitted. 3 9 The study of eugenics never rose above the level of a
pseudo-science because of wide gaps in knowledge about how ge32

See Thomas K. Gilhool, The Right to Community Services, in THE MENTALLY RE-

TARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 172 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976). See generally Nor-

man R. Ellis, Issues in Mental Retardation, 1 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 9 (1975) (discussing

various therapeutic approaches to mental retardation).
33 See Jo Ann Chandler & Sterling Ross, Jr., Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in
the Community, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 305.
34 See supra notes 16-17.
35 A dated version of this view is provided by psychologist Henry H. Goddard's
empirical study of the geneology of the Kallikak family, in which he offers the following
assessment:
Feeblemindedness is hereditary and transmitted as surely as any other
character. We cannot successfully cope with [social deviancy] until we

recognize feeble-mindedness and its hereditary nature....
In considering the question of care, segregation through colonization seems in the present state of our knowledge to be the ideal and perfectly satisfactory method.
HENRY H. GODDARD, THE KAALuKAg FAMILY 117 (1912).

36 Specifically, the dominant model was one of Mendelian genetic inheritance. The
ability of such a model to explain the appearance of retardation has since been widely
questioned. See RobertJ. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. FundamentalValues?, 81

COLUM. L. REV. 1418 (1981); Dunn, supra note 24, at 284-87.
37 See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1429-30.
38 See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13; Cynkar, supra note 36; Dunn, supra note
25; and Lombardo, supra note 13.
39
See HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1922)
(written from the point of view of a contemporary advocate of eugenic sterilization);
George T. Skinner, Note, A Sterilization Statutefor Kentucky?, 23 Ky. LJ. 168 (1934).
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netics actually worked. 40 The legal ramifications of the eugenics
movement, however, have proved much more durable. 4 1
Similarly, other areas of the law that intersect with mental disability, such as adoption 4 2 and marriage, 4 3 are highly receptive to the
disabling paradigm. 44 For example, despite the Supreme Court's
enunciation of a protected right to keep a child that one has "sired
and raised,"' 45 over forty states do not require parental consent to
adoption if a parent is "incompetent." 46 Only a few states require
notice to an incompetent parent or a hearing before a decision is
made.4 7 Likewise, despite the Court's declaration that "[m]arriage
is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival," 48 over forty states restrict the marital rights of
"imbeciles," individuals "under guardianship," "mental retardates," the "feebleminded," and so on. 4 9 Such laws are disabling in
nature because they adopt the view that disability equals incapability. Furthermore, by forgoing individualized determinations in
favor of blanket presumptions, they legitimize prejudice against the
developmentally disabled.
B.

The "Enabling" Paradigm

Like the disabling paradigm, the enabling paradigm originated
in a medical and legal conception of disability. 50 In contrast to the
precautionary nature of the disabling paradigm, "the enabling paradigm represents the more optimistic and dynamic view of a disabled
person's capabilities. In fact, holders of the enabling view typically
believe that negative expectations are partially responsible for the
51
debilitating effects of many disabilities.
40 The impulse behind eugenics has also been criticized as fundamentally isolationist, xenophobic, and totalitarian. See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1432.
41
See infra part II.A.
42
See Patricia M. Wald, The Legal Rights of People with MentalDisabilities in the Community: A Pleafor Laissez Faire, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1033,
1061 (BruceJ. Ennis et al. eds., 1973).
43
Id. at 1044.
44
See generally Randy A. Hertz, Note, Retarded Parentsin Neglect Proceedings: The Erroneous Assumption of ParentalInadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV. 785 (1979) (discussing sterotypical presumptions underlying restrictive adoption laws).
45 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
46
Wald, supra note 42, at 1061.
47 Id. at 1061-62.
48
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 112 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
49 Wald, supra note 42, at 1044.
50 Some of the general characteristics that this Note refers to as the "enabling"
paradigm in the therapeutic/psychology setting are set forth in Roos, supra note 3, at
613-15.
51 See Hertz, supra note 44; cf Hayman, supra note 4, at 1244-45 (discussing.the
"helplessness-condoning" effect of negative expectations).
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The source of the enabling paradigm is difficult to pinpoint, but
it appears to have originated both in widespread dissatisfaction over
the predictive validity of diagnostic tests used to determine the severity of mental disability52 and in an increased awareness of the
great influence that environmental factors may exert on the developmentally disabled's quality of life. 53 However this paradigm shift
originated, the perception that the developmentally disabled are beyond the hope of a "normal" life has undergone drastic revision in
the course of this century. At present, the dominant view is that
one's surroundings can greatly alter the impact of developmental
54
disability on one's potential for a normal life.

The enabling view is the impetus behind therapeutic devices
such as community care centers for the disabled.5 5 The expectation
behind such centers is that care programs exposing residents to the
daily life of the community can alleviate the damaging effects of
mental disability. 5 6 While these programs have encountered varying degrees of success and much community opposition, 5 7 they do
provide a more beneficial and stimulating atmosphere than the
highly restrictive and artificial environment at a typical state mental
58
institution.
The enabling paradigm has likewise found forceful expression
in the legal sphere, largely because of the therapeutic revolution discussed above 59 and the civil rights movement of the 1960s. 60 The
atmosphere of politicalization among traditionally powerless minority groups, including the disabled, 6 1 led to the creation of disability
52 See Hayman, supra note 4, at 1213-16; Michael S. Sorgen, Labeling and Classification, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 214.
53
Roos, supra note 3; Hayman, supra note 4, at 1213-16.
54 See Thomas K. Gilhool, supra note 32, at 179-80.
55 See generally id. at 173-82 (changing assumptions about the retarded's ability to
benefit from community services justifies legal protection of those services).
56 Chandler & Ross, supra note 33, at 310.
57 Id.; see also Laura L. Robinson, Note, The Controversy over Community Residencesfor
the Mentally Retarded, 13 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 119 (1989) (examining social and legal
issues with a view towards possible solutions). The debate surrounding community care
for the retarded has engendered numerous suits, one of which resulted in a controversial Supreme Court decision, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432
(1985); see discussion infra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
58 Cf Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 6, at 251 (examining legal protections afforded the insti-

tutionalized); Barbara A. Weiner, Treatment Rights, in

THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE

LAw, supra note 6, at 327 (discussing treatment of the mentally disabled in state
institutions).
59 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
60
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw § 1.02 (1989).
61 The disabled have been recognized as a minority. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES OF HANDICAPPED AMS: PUB. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 29
(1980).
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law advocacy projects. These projects have served as sources of
funding for litigation as well as clearinghouses for information on
the growing legal rights of the disabled. 6 2
Likewise, legal manifestations of the civil rights movement,
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,63 helped lay the groundwork at
a national level for codifying the rights of the disabled. 64 In the wake
of federal action many states amended their antidiscrimination statutes to cover discriminatory acts against the disabled. 65 This legislative activity resulted in the creation of statutorily imposed mandates
to adopt an enabling view of the disabled in certain contexts, such as
education, 66 employment, 67 and the provision of public services. 6 8
One must recognize however, that the legally enabling view of
the disabled fundamentally differs from the disabling view that has
traditionally dominated the law. 69 The recent passage of the ADA 70
only exacerbates this tension. The remainder of this Note demonstrates the potential difficulties that may result from the co-existence
of these polar conceptions of disability by focusing on the legal issues involved in state mandated sterilization of the developmentally
7
disabled. '

62

See What is the Mental Health Law Project?, in 3

LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY

HANDICAPPED, supra note 42, at 1517.
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).

64

Cf

PERLIN,

supra note 60 (discussing the genesis of disability discrimination

laws).
65 See John Parry, Decision-making Rights Over Persons and Property, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 687-88. Note, however, the state legislation in

some cases actually produced federal legislation, at least in the area of education. Id. at
634.
66
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
67 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
68 Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 100146, 101 Stat. 840 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
69 See Hayman, supra note 4, at 1210 (arguing that laws placing society's interests
before the retarded's are nearly always inconsistent with laws emphasizing
normalization).
70 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1992).
71 The current poles of debate involve, on the one hand, the view that the developmentally disabled should preferably never be subject to involuntary sterilization, Ross,
supra note 3, at 643, and on the other hand, the view that sterilization is a family decision
akin to a protected privacy right, and that family members should be allowed to make
the sterilization decision with minimal degrees of interference from the state. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DuxE LJ. 806.
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II
STERILIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED:
ARENA OF CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES

A.

AN

The Eugenic Enterprise: Sterilization in the United States

Reproductive control of the disabled is not a new idea. 72 Involuntary sterilization as a widespread phenomenon in the United
States dates from the early decades of this century, when sterilization statutes were passed en masse by state legislatures 73 under the
influence of progressive politics and the pseudo-science of eugenics. 74 The discipline of eugenics, strongly influenced by social Darwinism, claimed as its goal the betterment of the human race
through the study and classification of genetic traits, establishing in
the process a ranking of desirable and undesirable traits for human
75
propagation.
According to the eugenicists, retardation was a remediable social evil that could be genetically isolated and effectively neutralized
76
through the sterilization of those who were obviously afflicted.
Despite the questionable scientific basis for this assertion, 7 7 sterilization of the developmentally disabled captured the legislative imagination. This was partly due to the well-organized and politically
effective lobbying groups that espoused the cause to various state
legislatures. 78 Such legislation also became popular as a cost-saving
device: these statutes typically provided for the discharge of the
sterilized person from state custodial care, thus saving the state the
expense of full-time care for that person, as well as for any possible
79
offspring.
72 Eugenic breeding was advocated at least as early as Plato. See Cynkar, supra note
36, at 1432 n.63.
73 The first sterilization statute was enacted in Indiana in 1907. By 1925, twentythree states had passed such laws. Id. at 1433.
74 The following defines eugenics:
Derived from the Greek word meaning "well-born," the term eugenics
was coined by Sir Francis Galton in 1883 who defined it as "the study of
agencies under social control that may improve or impair... future generations either physically or mentally."
Estacio, supra note 25, at 91-92.
75 See Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1428.
76 See id at 1429.
77 See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1008; Elyce Z. Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIo ST. LJ. 591, 604 (1966) ("In short, the present
state of our scientific knowledge does not justify the widespread use of the sterilization
procedures in mentally ill or mentally deficient persons ....
(testimony of Dr. Bernard
L. Diamond, special consultant to the American Psychiatric Association)).
78 For a fascinating account of political and scientific figures working behind the
scenes to get Virginia's eugenic sterilization law passed, see Cynkar, supra note 36, at
1435-40.
79
Cf Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1014-15 (discussing fiscal considerations behind state-sanctioned sterilization).
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These factors spurred legislatures into passing statutes that allowed either the superintendent of a custodial care institution or a
guardian to consent to sterilization of the disabled person.8 0 Because it was often the guardian who decided to sterilize in the first
place, consent was rarely denied. 8 1 Courts initially reacted with hostility to this legislation.8 2 Frequently the statutes, many of which
lacked effective limits on the decisionmaker's discretion, were struck
down as unconstitutional.8 3 Many courts held that the statutes violated either due process, by failing to provide a hearing prior to
sterilization,8 4 or equal protection, by affecting only disabled persons in institutions.8 5
In reaction to these adverse rulings, some state legislatures
amended their statutes to require a formal hearing before authorizing the operation.8 6 However, in the case of Buck v. Bell,8 7 the
Supreme Court settled the questions of substantive due process and
80 A representative example of this type of statute is Virginia's sterilization statute,
now repealed:
Whereas, both the health of the individual patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental
defectives under careful safeguard and by competent and contientious
authority, and
Whereas, such sterilization may be effected in males by the operation
of vasectomy and in females by the operation of salpingectomy, both of
which said operations may be performed without serious pain or substantial danger to the life of the patient, and
Whereas, the Commonwealth has in custodial care and is supporting
in various State institutions many defective persons who if now discharged or paroled would likely become by the propagation of their kind
a menace to society but who if incapable of procreating might properly
and safely be discharged or paroled and become self-supporting with
benefit both to themselves and to society, and
Whereas, human experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy
and crime, now, therefore
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That whenever
the superintendent of [a state mental institution] shall be of the opinion
that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that any inmate of the institution under his care should be sexually sterilized, such
superintendent is hereby authorized to perform, or cause to be performed by some capable physician or surgeon, the operation of sterilization on any such patient confined in such institution ....
Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1968).
81
By 1973, over 50,000 sterilization operations had been performed. See Wald,
supra note 42, at 1055.
82 Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1000-01.
83 See, e.g., Brewer v. Valk, 167 S.E. 638 (N.C. 1933).
84 See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921).
85 See Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners
of Feeble-Minded 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913).
86 See generally Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded- Constitutional, Statutoy and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L. REv. 943, 945 (1982).
87 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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equal protection scrutiny for the developmentally disabled and revitalized the eugenic sterilization movement with one stroke. 8 8
The statute at issue in Buck 8 9 allowed the superintendent of a
mental health institution to petition for the sterilization of residents
suffering from hereditary mental defects. 90 At the superintendent's
discretion, the petition could be brought before the institution's
board of directors. The only limitations upon the board's decision
were the statutory directions that sterilization be in the best interests of society and that the operation be performed "without detriment to [the] general health" of the developmentally disabled
person. 9 1 Procedurally, the statute allowed for the appointment of a
guardian to represent the resident's interests at a pre-decision hearing and provided for a review of the Board's decision by the state
92
appellate courts.
While these procedural protections effectively nullified the
threat of procedural due process challenges, 93 the question remained whether involuntary sterilization statutes could be struck
down for substantive reasons. 94 In rejecting the claim that the statute was an impermissible exercise of authority unjustified by the
vague "best interests of society" standard, the Supreme Court delivered an especially abrasive opinion, 9 5 indicating the dominance of
96
the disabling paradigm at that time.
Noting that the state's interest in preserving the public welfare
occasionally justified sacrificing the lives of our "best citizens," the
Court opined: "[i]t would be strange if [the state] could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices.., in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence."' 97 In other words, the privacy interests of the disabled are
88
89

90
91
92
93

See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1001.
Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1968).
274 U.S. at 206.
See supra note 80 (quoting portions of the Virginia sterilization statute).
274 U.S. at 206.
Id. at 207. In writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated that:
There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the lights of
the patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in this case
was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of
observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the plaintiff in error has
had due process of law.

Id
94

Id.

Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1006-07.
Justice Holmes, author of the majority opinion in Buck v. Bell, was a noted supporter of the eugenics movement. At that time, several members of the Court ascribed
to the Social Darwinist views that so strongly influenced the eugenics movement.
Cynkar, supra note 36, at 1451.
97 274 U.S. at 207.
95
96
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accorded little weight in comparison to the state's interest in regulating their procreation.
One's acceptance of this result depends upon how highly one
values reproductive privacy rights for the developmentally disabled.
For example, one may generally favor reproductive privacy protections but feel that the state's interest in interfering with privacy is
considerably stronger when the person claiming the protection is
disabled. Arguably, however, a showing of disability alone should
not increase the state's interest without a showing that sterilization
is justified in the individual case. 98 The Buck decision, however, allows states to sterilize developmentally disabled individuals on little
more than a showing that they are in fact disabled. 9 9 In Buck, the
disabling paradigm became a matter of constitutional law, as a protected element of the states' inherent power to act in the public
interest.1 00
In the post-opinion rush to adopt involuntary sterilization statutes, thirty states passed such laws. 10 1 Although most states have
either altered the tone of sterilization statutes to minimize their eugenic origin or have repealed them entirely, the statutes that currently exist are inconsistent; legislatures follow either the disabling
paradigm, the enabling paradigm, or a combination of the two.102
Legal issues surrounding sterilization of the developmentally
disabled magnify the conflict between disabling and enabling paradigms of disability. For example, a lawmaker framing the sterilization decision within the disabling paradigm may authorize
involuntary sterilizations more often and with a minimal degree of
procedural protections on the assumption that a person who is significantly mentally disabled is both unlikely to contribute to the
quality of the communal gene pool and unable to cope with the results of parenthood.10 3 Under this approach, any protected interest
See Wald, supra note 42, at 1059 (citation omitted).
According to the tenets of eugenic science, a mentally retarded person is automatically "the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted," and is therefore subject to sterilization under the Virginia law upheld in Buck.
274 U.S. at 207.
100 Id ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.") (Holmes, J.).
101 Julie Marcus, Note, In Re Romero: Sterilization and Competency, 68 DENV. U. L.
Rav. 105, 106 (1991).
102
Cf Dunn, supra note 24. In an appendix, the author provides an informative
breakdown of the sterilization statutes on the books as of 1975. Of the 24 statutes analyzed, only 5 required a court proceeding; 16 gave authority to institute the proceeding
to the superintendant of a care facility; 19 required the subject to be present at the
proceeding; only 16 required the subject to receive notice of the decision and 12 gave
the subject the right to obtain counsel.
103
See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 39, at 168.
98

99
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the disabled person may have in her reproductive autonomy would
pale in comparison to the state's interest in preventing the proliferation of retarded or neglected children.
Conversely, a lawmaker acting within the enabling paradigm
may deny involuntary sterilization absent a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that parenthood would be beyond the capacity
of the disabled person or would seriously harm that person.° 4 Such
a lawmaker will not readily assume that a person who meets a
clinical standard of mental disability is more likely to have afflicted
or neglected offspring, and will therefore believe that maximum deference should be given to her reproductive autonomy.' 0 5
B.

Disabling and Enabling Paradigms in the Sterilization
Context: Legislation

The intervening shift in the medical and legal perceptions of
persons with disabilities, 10 6 coupled with the development of "reproductive privacy" jurisprudence, 10 7 has led to a radical shift in the
policy justification behind sterilization statutes. 10 Such statutes are
currently justified as guaranteeing an important privacy right for the
developmentally disabled, who would otherwise be unable to
choose sterilization 0 9 because doctors will refuse to perform the
operation absent legal authority."Il 0 This rationale works well only if
104
Cf Brakel, supra note 6, at 218 (condemning eugenic sterilization rationales and
advocating stringent protections on reproductive autonomy).
105 See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981)
(The right to choose among procreation, sterilization and other methods
of contraception is an important privacy right of all individuals. Our
courts must preserve that right. When an incompetent person lacks
mental capacity to make that choice, a court should ensure exercise of
that right on behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or
her best interests.);
Ross, supra note 3, at 642-43.
106 See supra notes 29-78 and accompanying text; see also Brakel, supra note 6, at 1718.
107
See infra notes 131-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that sterilization of the
developmentally disabled may be increasingly used as a tool for "normalization").
108 Cf Burnett, supra note 13, at 923-24.
109 See Scott, supra note 71, at 807:
Sterilization law has undergone a radical transformation in recent years.
Influenced by a distaste for eugenic sterilization and a desire to redress
past injustices, the emerging law seeks to protect the interests of mentally
disabled persons by erecting formidable barriers to sterilization. The
policy goals of this reform movement are commendable. However, in its
singleminded effort to prevent erroneous sterilizations, the law departs
from its underlying objectives: to protect where possible the individual's
right to make her own reproductive decisions and to ensure that any decision made by others will best protect her interests (citation omitted).
110 See Alan B. Munro, Note, The Sterilization Rights of Mental Retardates, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 207, 212-13 (1982).
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the statute authorizing sterilization maximizes the disabled person's

ability to choose. This, however, is often not the case.
States that confer authority to order sterilizations by statute
vary widely in their protection of the disabled person's reproductive
autonomy. They range from Mississippi, which has essentially the
same statute as that upheld in Buck v. Bell,' 1 ' to Maine, which maximizes reproductive autonomy through a series of strict procedural
and substantive protections." 2 The difference between the Mississippi and Maine statutes rests not merely upon a different degree of
awareness concerning the need to protect reproductive choice, but
also upon whether the operating assumption of the legislation is disabling or enabling." 3
These considerations are inextricably linked; normalization poliies naturally seek to preserve reproductive autonomy as an important facet of the retarded person's general autonomy," 4 whereas
eugenic policies see reproductive autonomy for the retarded as a
threat to the welfare of the state. 1 5 As this Note will show, sterilization laws failing to reflect an enabling view of the developmentally
111 Compare the following provisions of the Mississippi statutes with those of the
Virginia statute, discussed supra note 80 and accompanying text:
Whenever the director... shall be of the opinion that it is for the best
interests of the patients and of society that any inmate.., should be
sexually sterilized, such director is hereby authorized to perform... the
operation of sterilization on any such patient confined in such institution
afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness, or epilepsy...
If the board shall find that the inmate is insane, idiotic, imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic, and by the laws of heredity is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, that the said inmate may be sexually sterilized without detriment to his or her general
health, and that the welfare of the inmate and of society will be promoted
by such sterilization, the said board may order the director to perform...
the operation ....
See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1, 41-45-9 (1972 & Supp. 1992).
112 See The Due Process in Sterilization Act of 1982, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B &
§§ 7001-17 (West 1988). The Act requires a court order in all sterilizations. The Acts
also requires informed consent or statutorily authorized excuse from such consent. See
infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
113 For example, the Mississippi statute exhorts the board ruling on a sterilization
petition to consult the "laws of heredity" to determine if the subject is the "probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring." Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-9 (1972).
As stated earlier, such laws are highly questionable and likely serve to mask the unfounded fears and prejudices of the decision-maker. See supra part II.B.2.a.
In contrast, the Maine statute explicitly states its goal of normalization. See discussion of the Maine statute, infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
114 Cf Wald, supra note 42, at 1035-36. ("With an increasing acceptance of the principle of 'normalization,' however, I predict the future course of litigation in this field will
involve more rights to community services ... I believe it will also deal with the legal,
personal, and civil rights of [mentally retarded] people.").
115 See discussion supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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disabled represent substantively poor policy choices as well as possi116
ble violations of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
1. The Normalization Argument in the Legislative Context
The normalization argument in favor of maximally protective
sterilization laws seeks to conform sterilization law to other areas of
the law that reflect normalization policies. 117 Since these policies
encourage self-reliance and independence for the retarded, 118 they
are essentially enabling.
Sterilization decisions made within the enabling paradigm look
not to the tenuous ground of hereditary affliction, but rather to the
best interests of the retarded person and her ability to perform competently as a parent." 9 Thus, a legislature acting on the assumptions of the enabling paradigm will individualize the sterilization
proceeding, believing that a fair determination must involve an individual assessment.' 20 For example, the Maine Due Process in Sterilization Act12 1 requires a judicial determination that the disabled
person is "not able to give informed consent" before the guardian's
sterilization petition will be considered.' 2 2 Even then, the court may
only grant the petition if it finds that sterilization is in that person's
12 3
"best interests."'
Conversely, a legislative body acting within the disabling paradigm will be frugal with procedural protections, believing that, once
116
U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ...shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. "
117
See generally Scott, supra note 72, at 808.
118
See Roos, supra note 3, at 613-15.
119 Cf Wald supra note 42, at 1059 (quoting John B. Fotheringham The Concept of
Social Competence as appliedto Marriageand Child Care in Those Classified as Mentally Retarded,
104 CMAJ. 813 (1971)).
120 For example, Oregon's sterilization statute requires the following findings:
a) the individual is physically capable of procreating;
b) the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in
the near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy;
c) all less drastic alternative contraceptive measures, including supervision, education and training, have proved unworkable or inapplicable, or
are medically contra-indicated;
d) the proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard medical
practice, is the least intrusive method available and appropriate, and can
be carried out without reasonable risk to the life and health of the individual; and
e) the nature and extent of the individual's disability, as determined.by
empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable of caring for and raising a
child, even with reasonable assistance.

OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205 (1992).
121
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7001-17 (West 1988).
122

Id. § 7004.

123

Id. § 7010.
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the crucial element of developmental disability is established, more
process would only inhibit the legislative agenda. 124 For example,
under the Mississippi sterilization statute, the subject of a sterilization proceeding may obtain judicial review only after the hospital
board of trustees makes an initial determination. 125 Even then, the
court proceeding is limited to a determination of whether the board
has any foundation for its belief that "the inmate is insane, idiotic,
imbecile . . . and by the laws of heredity is the probable potential
12 6
parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted."'
If one favors the implementation of normalization policies
through law, one will likewise favor the assumptions and results implicit in enabling legislation. This is because legislation that individualizes the sterilization decision necessarily conforms with policies
that seek to augment the autonomy and self-reliance of disabled
persons.' 2 7 Similarly, one favoring policies of normalization will
condemn disabling sterilization legislation primarily on three
grounds: 1) it devalues the mentally disabled person by appropriating an important aspect of her autonomy without a showing that
128
such appropriation is necessary to further a compelling interest;
Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927):
The judgment [of the directors] finds that Carrie Buck "is the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that
she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization" and thereupon makes the order. In view of the general declarations
of the Legislature and the specific findings of the Court, obviously we
cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they
exist they justify the result.
Id. at 207.
Since no evidence was presented concerning Carrie Buck's ability to be a parent,
and there was no suggestion that mental or physical harm would occur as a result of
pregnancy, it is apparent that the sterilization decision was based primarily on Buck's
"feeble-mindedness."
125 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-11 (1972).
126 Cf MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-13 (1972)
(Upon such review, the said chancery court, or judge thereof, may affirm,
revise, or reverse the orders of the board of trustees of mental institutions so reviewed and may enter such order as it deems just and right
124

Implicitly, the court will review the Board's decision under the controlling language of
the Mississippi statute. This limiting language is quoted in the text supra.
127 But see Burnett, supra note 13, at 923 ("Sterilization of the retarded may increase
with the growing acceptance of the concept of 'normalization' as a primary goal in the
treatment of the disabled.... Some parents, legislators, and judges may regard sterilization as a prerequisite to community living.").
This conclusion seems counter-intuitive, however, when one considers the adverse
psychological impact of sterilization on the retarded individual, a consequence with devastating implications for any course of treatment emphasizing normalization. See Philip
Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1 LAw & PsYcHiATRY REv. 47
(1975).
128
See Ross, supra note 3, at 611.
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2) it frustrates normalization policies by discouraging, rather than
encouraging, autonomy and self-reliance on the part of the disabled; 12 9 and 3) it places the disabled in an equivocal position
before the law by subjecting their reproductive freedoms to a large
degree of uncertainty. 130 This last point foreshadows the second
substantive basis upon which one may attack disabling presumptions in legislation.
2.

The ConstitutionalArgument in the Legislative Context

Although the Supreme Court has not considered due process
and equal protection arguments against involuntary sterilization
statutes since Buck v. Bell, 13 1 commentators have suggested that the
intervening years and the rise of reproductive privacy rights would
mandate a different result were the case adjudicated today. 132 At the
very least, these developments mandate a reassessment of Justice
Holmes' analysis in Buck.
The strongest argument against the constitutional validity of
minimally protective statutes, such as Mississippi's, rests upon substantive due process protections against laws that infringe upon reproductive autonomy and family privacy. 133 Indeed, -one of the
foundational cases establishing present privacy protections, Skinner
v. Oklahoma,13 4 involved a sterilization statute that was struck down
as unconstititional.13 5 In Skinner, the petitioner, a recidivist felon
who had tWice been convicted of robbery, was sentenced to sterilization under a statute that authorized the sterilization of persons previously convicted two or more times of crimes " 'amounting to
felonies involving moral turpitude.' "136
See Id. at 621; Dunn, supra note 24, at 293-94.
See Burnett, supra note 13, at 924.
131
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
132 See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (N.J. 1981); Burnett, supra note 13, at
919; Dunn, supra note 24, at 297.
133
See LAUREbiCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1339-40 (2d ed. 1988):
Although the Court had earlier upheld the state's power to sterilize an
individual against her objection in order to prevent the birth of whatJustice Holmes callously characterized as "imbeciles," and although that earlier holding continues to be cited without obvious disapproval from time
to time, it is hard to square the basic philosophy of Skinner v. Oklahoma
with the proposition that the state may usurp the individual's procreative
choices in an irreversible way-whether by sterilization or compulsory
breeding... [t]he meaning of Skinner is that whether one person's body shall be
the source of anotherlife must be left to that person and that person alone to decide.
(citations omitted).
Id.
129

130

134
135

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
OILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-82 (West 1935) (declared unconstitutional in

1942).
136 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause13 7 because it exempted from the sterilization penalty those guilty of "embezzlement, political offenses and revenue
act violations," crimes that were "intrinsically the same" as robbery.13 8 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race ....

[In] evil or

reckless hands [the power to sterilize] can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.
There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
13 9
touches.... [He] is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
Although the decision did not explicitly overrule Buck v. Bell, its
rationale severely limited Justice Holmes' conclusion that the statute
at issue in Buck did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' 40 Justice Douglas's opinion in Skinner indicates that a more rigorous scrutiny is applicable to sterilization statutes than the "rational basis"
test implicitly used in Buck.' 4 ' As a result, a state cannot mandate
sterilization merely by indicating a policy and drawing a convenient
line, 4 2 but, rather, should indicate an interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the "basic civil right" at stake.1 4 3 Presumably, a
vague and unsubstantiated fear of being "swamped with incompetence"' 44 would not suffice as a compelling interest.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, such as Griswold v. Connecticut,' 4 5 Eisenstadtv. Baird,146 and Carey v. PopulationServices Interna137
U.S. CONST., amend XIV (nor shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
138 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
139 Id.
140 See TRIBE, supra note 133; Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1011.
141 See Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note 13, at 1009

(One of the most basic problems with the Buck v. Bell decision is its superficial constitutional analysis .... [Tihe rational basis [test used in Buck]
has ceased to be the only test for equal protection arguments. Today,
strict scrutiny and even a balancing approach may be used.).
142 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty ofjust and equal laws.").
143 See Burnett, supra note 13 at 919; Ross, supra note 3 at 611; Estacio, supra note 25,
at 92-93; see also North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451
(M.D.N.C. 1976) (applying strict scrutiny review to sterilization claim).
144 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
145 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a statute outlawing the use of contraceptives is
unconstitutionally restrictive of married couple's right of privacy).
146 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending fundamental right of privacy over contraceptive
decisions to single persons).
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tiona1147 have both reaffirmed the notion that reproductive
autonomy is an important civil right and broadened the significance
of that right to strike down statutes on both due process and equal
48
protection grounds.'
49
The most recent of these cases is Carey v. Population Services.'
In Carey, the Court invalidated a New York law' 5 0 that allowed only
pharmacists to sell nonmedical contraceptive devices to persons
over sixteen.' 5 ' Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Brennan found that the decision to use contraceptives fell squarely
within the zone of protected privacy interests delineated in Griswold.' 52 The Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to the statute's
prohibition on the sale of contraceptives, stating that, "where a decision as fundamental as that of whether to bear or beget a child is
involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only
by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."' 53 The Court found none of the inter15 4
ests advanced to be sufficiently compelling.
Involuntary sterilization is a form of nonconsensual contraception.1 55 Sterilization statutes should therefore be subject to strict
scrutiny analysis under the Carey standard. 15 6 As this Note will
147 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (ruling that legislation impacting decision to "bear and beget a child" is subject to strict scrutiny review).
148
WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 455 (6th ed. 1986).
149 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
150 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
151 The statute at issue made it a misdemeanor for any person to sell or distribute
contraceptives to a minor under sixteen years old. The statute also restricted the distribution of contraceptives to licensed pharmacists for persons of any age. Carey, 431 U.S.
at 681 n.1.
152
Carey, 431 U.S. at 685
(The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart
of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right
first explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Conneticut ...[I]n a
field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human activities and
relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception
are among the most private and sensitive (citations omitted)).
153 Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
154 While noting that state interests such as "maintaining medical standards," "protecting health," and "protecting potential life" would qualify as "compelling," 431 U.S.
at 689-90, the Court felt that none of these interests were furthered by the New- York
statute.
155 See Bernard M. Dickens, Retardation and Sterilization, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
295, 297 (1982).
156 The test used in Carey was originally announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155-56 (1973) ("[W]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may bejustified only by a 'compelling state interest,'
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." (citations omitted)).
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show, an application of the Carey test to both the Maine Due Process
in Sterilization Act and the Mississippi Sexual Sterilization Act indicates that enabling and disabling presumptions in law affect the constitutional validity of legislation that touches the reproductive
privacy rights of the developmentally disabled.
a. ConstitutionalCase Study: The Mississippi Statute
The primary interest underlying Mississippi's sterilization statute is the prevention of hereditary disability among the state's citizens.' 57 This interest is linked to the presumptory conclusion that
mental disability obeys some vaguely defined "law of heredity," and
implies that the state may sterilize those whose genetic contributions to the public weal are likely to be deficient. The rationale for
this statute is thus explicitly eugenic, and its operative paradigm is
disabling.15 8 Moreover, an application of the Carey test to the Mississippi law indicates that it infringes upon the liberty interests of
developmentally disabled persons in violation of the Due Process
Clause.
This infringement occurs because the state's interest fails to be
compelling and the means used to fulfill that interest fail to be narrowly tailored. In comparison to interests deemed compelling, such
as maintaining medical standards or protecting potential life,' 59 a
state's interest in the genetic quality of its citizens seems deficient.
Moreover, there is a lack of hard evidence suggesting that mentally
disabled parents are significantly more likely to produce mentally
disabled offspring than are normal parents.' 60 In fact, studies indicate that it is more likely that a normal parent will produce disabled
offspring than a developmentally disabled parent per se.' 6'
In addition, if the Mississippi statute implicitly supports the interest of the state in insuring the genetic quality of its citizens, it is
difficult to characterize the statute as a "narrowly tailored" means to
achieve that end. As written, the Mississippi statute is both underin-

157 The purpose of the statute is to allow the involuntary sterilization of persons
"afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, or feeble-mindedness." Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1972).
158 For the connection between disabling presumptions and eugenic sterilization
statutes, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
159 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977).
160 See Dunn, supra note 24, at 286-87.
161 See Eugenic Sterilization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 212 (Samuel J.
Brakel et al. eds., rev. ed. 1971).
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clusive t62 and overinclusive. 16 3 It is underinclusive, because if the
state wishes to curtail hereditary afflictions,' 64 it should sterilize all
persons having identifiable hereditary afflictions, including alcoholism and myopia. It is overinclusive because the broad rubric of de165
velopmental disabilities, many of them environmental in origin,
forces the state either to determine whether the particular form of
retardation at issue is genetically transmissible or to risk sterilizing a
mentally disabled person whose affliction is non-hereditary.
b.

ConstitutionalCounterpoint: The Maine Statute

The primary purpose underlying Maine's sterilization act is to
ensure the well-being of its mentally disabled citizens through equal
access to "desired medical procedures."'166 Statutes premised upon
the "best interests" of the retarded person, while capable of abuse,
are more likely to support enabling assumptions about the reproductive privacy rights of the developmentally disabled. 167 Furthermore, such statutes are more likely to withstand the constitutional
analysis outlined in Carey. Whereas eugenic statutes place greater
value on a disability-free society than on a mentally disabled person's right to "bear and beget" a child, "best interests" statutes
generally stress reproductive choice. 168 Thus, Maine's Due Process
in Sterilization Act of 1982169 states in its preamble:
[S]terilization procedures are generally irreversible and represent
potentially permanent and highly significant consequences for the
patient involved. The Legislature recognizes that certain legal
safeguards are necessary to prevent indiscriminate and unnecessary sterilization and to assure equal access to desired medical
1 70
procedures for all Maine citizens.
162
A statute is underinclusive when a classification drawn by the statute fails to include within its boundries all persons who may cause the harm that the statute seeks to
address. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV.341 (1949).
163
A statute is overinclusive if it draws a classification that contains persons who are
not causing the harm it seeks to avoid. Id.
164
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
165
See Ross, supra note 3, at 613.
166
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7002 (West 1988).
167
In fact, best interests standards for authorizing involuntary sterilization are commonly justified as the state's constructive use of the retarded person's ability to consent,
which they cannot exercize due to their disability. It has been argued that such statutes
are necessary in order to guaranty the retarded person's ability to choose sterilization.
Carla I. Struble, Note, Protection of the Mentally RetardedIndividual'sRight to Choose Sterilization: the Effect of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 413, 418
(1983).
168
See Denise Lachance, In re Grady: The Mentally Retarded Individual'sRight to Choose
Sterilization, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 559, 572 (1981).
169
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-17 (West 1988).
170 Id. § 7002.
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The Maine statute is conceived, not as a way to protect society's
interest in genetic purity, but as an opportunity to impose important
safeguards on a dangerous medical procedure.' 7' The orientation
of Maine's statute significantly differs from that of the Mississippi
Sexual Sterilization Act. Maine's statute provides "equal access to
medical procedures" for the mentally disabled by enabling others to
make the sterilization decision on their behalf in certain specified
instances.' 7 2 In short, the Maine statute is a clear reflection of the
policies of normalization and is cast squarely within the enabling
73
paradigm.
Significantly, the very qualities that characterize the Due Process in Sterilization Act as an "enabling" statute also cause it to be
amenable to a constitutional analysis under the Carey test. The
"compelling state interest" standard is arguably met by the need for
legislatures to provide guidance in the administration of a politically
sensitive medical procedure that would otherwise be left to the discretion of state courts. 174 Doctors, fearful of potential tort liability,
generally refuse to sterilize mentally disabled patients without the
approval of a legal authority. 175 In the absence of legislation, courts
generally refuse jurisdiction 76 or hear the case and apply their own
version of a best interests test. 17 7 These common law tests often
provide negligible protection for the disabled person's privacy, and
may ignore the potential health risks of the operation altogether. 78
171
Sheila M. Donahue, Note, In re Debra B.: The Best Interest Standardin Court-Authorized Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 39 ME. L. REv. 209, 210-11 (1987).
172
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7010-7013 (West 1988).
173 Recall that the normalization principle urges that retarded people be treated as
much as possible like other people. Roos, supra note 3, at 614. The Maine statute furthers this goal by attempting to extend equal access to medical procedures to retarded
persons.
174
See Burnett, supra note 13, at 928.
175
See Munro, supra note 110, at 211.
176 See, e.g., Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. 1969) (sterilization decision does
not fall within generaljurisdiction of the court); In re D.D., 394 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1977)
(noting that restrictions on right to bear children must meet "compelling state interest"
test and stating: "[t]he sounder view ...is that in the absence of specific statutory
authority, the courts lack jurisdiction to make this fundamental and irreversible
decision").
177
See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981) (noting the potential for
abuse but stating that "[s]ince the sterilization decision involves a variety of factors well
suited to rational development in judicial proceedings, a court can take cognizance of
these factors and reach a fair decision of what is the incompetent's best interest."); In re
Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976) (findingjurisdiction over the sterilization decision arising from "the common-law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as parens
patriae with respect to incompetents").
178
See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding state judge immune
from § 1983 suit brought by woman he had ordered sterilized; the judge had ordered
the sterilization at the request of the woman's mother without a hearing, notice to the
woman, or appointment of a guardian ad litem).
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Given these undesirable results, the state could certainly claim a
compelling interest in safeguarding the lives and well-being of mentally disabled persons by imposing uniformly rigorous standards for
sterilization.
Similarly, the Maine statute is narrowly tailored to enable the
developmentally disabled to be sterilized without their consent only
when health reasons necessitate such an operation. Procedural protections built into the statute make informed consent a prerequisite
to any sterilization; 17 9 in its absence, two hearings are required.
The first hearing determines whether the subject is capable of informed consent; if so, the operation will be authorized if consent is
given.' 8 0 If the subject is found incapable of informed consent, a
second hearing is held to determine whether sterilization is in her
best interests.' 8 ' For sterilization to be authorized, it must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) less drastic methods of contraception have proven to be unworkable, 8 2 and 2) sterilization is necessary to preserve the physical and mental health of the
person.' 8 3 The relationship between the means and ends of the
statute is tight, as only those who need the sterilization procedure
for health reasons are subject to the statute.
C.

The Persistence of the Disabling Paradigm and the Failure
of Fundamental Rights

Although legislative activity has increased the visibility of the
enabling paradigm, it is doubtful that the now largely conservative
Supreme Court 8 4 will overrule Buck v. Bell. 18 5 In fact, a string of
cases since Carey, which deal with the rights of developmentally disabled persons, have indicated that the Court's primary policy in this
86
area is one of non-intervention.'
In Youngberg v. Romeo,' 8 7 the Court considered the constitutional due process rights of involuntarily committed mentally disabled persons for the first time.' 8 The respondent was a
179
180

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

181
182

Id. § 7013.

34-B, § 7004.(1) (West 1988).

Id. § 7008.

Id.
Id.
Linda Greenhouse, Court Serves Notice of Its Transformation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1992 at E3.
185
274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussion, see supra notes 87-105 and accompanying
text.
186
See discussion infra notes 187-226 and accompanying text.
187
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
188
Id. at 314.
183
184
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profoundly retarded man 18 9 who suffered injuries as a result of poor
safety conditions at a state institution.19 0 The respondent claimed
constitutional rights to 1) safe conditions of confinement, 2) freedom from bodily restraint, and 3) minimally adequate
habilitation.19 1
In reasoning that an involuntarily committed person's liberty
interests "require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety,"' 9 2 the Court indicated in dicta
that a considerably less protective due process test may apply to
mentally disabled persons confined to state institutions:
In determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due
Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance "the
liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an organized society". . . the Constitution only requires that the courts make cer9
tain that professional judgment was in fact exercized.' 3
Thus, Youngberg develeps a balancing test for the protection of
due process rights of the developmentally disabled in state institutions that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to Mississippi's exhortation that sterilizations be performed when in the "best
interests of society."' 94 Under Youngberg, it could very well be that
the "demands of organized society," if pressing enough to justify
the neglectful treatment of disabled persons in state institutions,
would justify "therapeutic" involuntary sterilization.' 9 5 Ironically, if
interpreted in this way, Youngberg curtails the due process protections available to those that need them most: institutionalized per189 Id. at 309 ("Respondent ...has the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child,
with an I.Q. between 8 and 10.").
190 Id. at 310 ("The complaint alleged that 'during the periodJuly, 1974 to the present, plaintiff has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions.' ").
191 Id. at 315 ("[respondent] argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training within the institution.").
192 Id. at 319.
193 Id. at 320-21.
194 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
195
Admittedly, Youngberg concerned the institutionalized person's right to treatment, which is derived from due process protections of the "liberty" of the individual.
457 U.S. at 316; see also Linda V. Gallo, Note, Youngberg v. Romeo: The Right to Treatment Dilemma and the Mentally Retarded, 47 ALB. L. Rzv. 179, 187 (1982). Sterilization,
although it certainly touches upon one's "right to be free from physical restraint," is
generally thought to infringe upon the "penumbral" privacy rights of the individual,
which have typically been afforded a higher level of protection. Arguably, however, a
very close analogy exists between state interests implicated in Youngberg (fiscal and administrative necessity) and those at issue in sterilization cases. Moreover, the sterilization of an institutionalized person may be characterized as within the zone of deference
to the decisions of health care professionals calculated in Romeo. Cf.Phyllis P. Dietz,
Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Treatment in Light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 GEO. L.J.
1785, 1796 (1984).
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sons who, under the complete supervision of the state, are most
196
likely to suffer abuse at the state's hands.
The Court's abridgement of the rights of the institutionalized
disabled in Youngberg was continued in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 197 where the Court dispensed with the possibility that
the mentally disabled could qualify as a suspect or even "quasi-suspect" class. 198 In Cleburne, a Texas City Council denied a permit for
the operation of a group home for the developmentally disabled.' 9 9
The home was expected to house thirteen mentally disabled men
and women who would be under the constant supervision of staff
members. 20 0 The City Council denied the permit for the following
20
reasons: (1) the negative attitude of adjacent property owners; '
(2) concerns that residents would be subject to abuse from local
high school students; 20 2 (3) the location of the living center on a
"500 year flood plain"; 20 3 and (4) the size of the home and number
20 4
of prospective residents.
The Court found that the city's refusal to grant a permit violated the Equal Protection Clause because "the record [did] not reveal any rational basis for believing that the... home would pose
any special threat to the city's legitimate interests." 20 5 The real significance of Cleburne, however, was revealed in dicta, where Justice
White stated:
[W]e conclude ... that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification .... First, ...

those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope
with and function in the everyday world.... They are thus differ-

ent, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States' interest in
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one....
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments
about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the predicate for
such judicial oversight is present where the classification deals
20 6
with mental retardation.
196

See Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Persons, in THE MENTALLY Dis-

ABLED AND THE LAw, supra note

197

6 at 251.

473 U.S. 432 (1985).

198
See Mark V. Wunder, Comment, EqualProtection and the Mentally Retarded: A Denial
of Quasi-Suspect Status in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 72 IowA L. REv.
241-42 (1986).
199 473 U.S. at 437.
200
Id. at 435.
201
Id. at 448.
202 Id. at 449.
203 Id.

204
205
206

Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 442-43.
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The Court went on to distinguish the mentally disabled from other
"discrete and insular" minorities, whose isolation from majoritarian
legislatures has traditionally provided the justification for an interventionist response by the Court: 20 7
the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the
plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only
that they have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have
been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy... and a corresponding need for more intrusive
208
oversight by the judiciary.
Thus the Court openly declared itself to be relatively hostile to
an expansionist reading of fundamental rights for the developmentally disabled 2 09 and emphasized the disabled's "reduced ability to
cope with the everyday world." This formed the basis for its finding
that individuals with disabilities were "immutably different" and
thus subject to being singled out by legislatures without heightened
scrutiny.2 10 In doing so, the Court closed its eyes to the history of
alienation and abuse that defines much of the mentally disabled's
2
experience. 11
The majority's dismissive dicta has chilled the possibility of
greater constitutional protections for the developmentally disabled. 2 12 Cleburne suggests that the Court will apply a "rational basis" test 213 to legislation that singles out the disabled for special
treatment; Youngberg suggests that the rights of institutionalized
mentally disabled persons will be subject to a substantive due process "balancing" test. Read together, the tests limit the circumstances under which a Carey strict scrutiny test will be applied to
alleged violations of the disabled's privacy rights.
207
"[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
208
473 U.S. at 443.
209
See 473 U.S. at 446 ("[W]e will not presume that any given legislative action,
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the
Constitution will not tolerate.").
210

I& at 444.

See Brakel, supra note 6.
See 473 U.S. at 474 ("[Tfhe Court's as-applied remedy relegates future retarded
applicants to the standardless discretion of low-level officials who have already shown an
all too willing readiness to be captured by.. . 'vague, undifferentiated fears ...
.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
213
But see TRIBE, supra note 133, at 1444 (suggesting that the Court in Cleburne applied a hybrid scrutiny test somewhat more protective than the traditional rational basis
test).
211

212
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In addition, the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 14 which
held that private consensual homosexual sodomy is unprotected
under the Skinner-Griswold-Eisenstadt-Careyline of cases, 21 5 presents
yet another limitation on reproductive privacy rights for the disabled. In Bowers, the Court narrowed its reading of fundamental
rights either to those that "are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' " such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed," 21 6 or to those that are " 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "217
The history of involuntary sterilization 21 8 indicates that the notion of reproductive freedom for the developmentally disabled is
anything but "deeply rooted" in the nation's history. As Justice
Holmes' opinion in Buck 2 19 indicates, many have felt that justice demands the sterilization of the disabled so that the state may be
stronger, just as the state may demand the sacrifice of its "best citizens" in times of war. 2 20 The increasingly conservative Court is reluctant to expand its former role as protector of the
disenfranchised. 22 1 Consequently, the Court has implicitly denied
the mentally disabled rigorous constitutional protections on the
state's power to regulate their reproductive capabilities.
The implications of this development for a widespread adoption of the enabling paradigm in sterilization laws are disheartening.
The Court's retrenchment has ensured the continuing viability of
the disabling paradigm as the normative measure for laws affecting
the mentally disabled's reproductive privacy. According to Cleburne,
the disabled are "immutably different," and legislation singling
them out is thus afforded a presumption of validity. 22 2 In Youngberg,
the state's interest in administrative convenience outweighs the disabled's right to be free from unnecessary restraints. 2 23 Neither decision addresses the situation in which the state singles out
developmentally disabled persons for sterilization.
214
215
216

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 191-92.

217

Id.

218
219

See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).

220

Id. at 207.

In fact, the Court currently exhibits an active desire to shrink this role. See
Greenhouse, supra note 184, at E3 (discussing Presley v. Etowah County, 112 S. Ct. 820
(1992)).
222 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
223 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("By... limiting judicial review
of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized.").
221
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Sterilization statutes should pass the Carey test because they are
state actions affecting the decision to reproduce. Equally clear,
however, is the Court's consensus that special laws addressed to the
disabled are acceptable. 224 The implication is that a strict scrutiny
test may not be applicable to sterilization statutes addressed solely
to the disabled.
In previous sections of this Note, the advantage of enabling assumptions has been discussed. 2 25 The problem is that the notion of
a constitutionally protected right of reproductive privacy for the developmentally disabled lacks solid grounding. The right of reproductive privacy is crucial to the widespread implementation of
enabling assumptions in sterilization laws. The limitations of the
Supreme Court decisions discussed above provide a shaky foundation for fostering reproductive privacy rights, especially for a group
that historically has had none. However, Justice White was quite
correct in Cleburne when he emphasized the growing role that remedial legislation has played in shaping the rights of the mentally disabled. 2 26 The remainder of this Note focuses on Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its impact upon statesanctioned sterilizations of the disabled.

THE AMERICANS wrrI

III
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: A

FEDERAL MANDATE FOR THE ENABLING

PARADIGM?
Although our dignity and confidence make us strive to be independent and invulnerable, compassion and reality require us to
recognize the vulnerability that social structures often exacerbate.
The task is thus truly a Herculean one. While it may be too much
to ask of any law, the ADA by its ambition, invites the question:
2 27
does it meet the challenge?
The newly enacted Americans with Disabilities Act 2 28 (ADA) arguably addresses the decision to sterilize involuntarily a developmentally disabled person.
Policies of normalization, which seek to alleviate the impact of
disabilities by bringing disabled persons into the social mainstream,
provide the basis for enabling legislation. Statutes based upon enabling assumptions will seek to maximize autonomy in order to en224

225
226
227

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444.
See supra notes 184-223 and accompanying text.
473 U.S. at 443.

Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 L.

MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 334 (1990).
228
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West

Supp. 1992).
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courage integration. These goals are at the core of the ADA, a
statute primarily intended to foster independence by eradicating
2 29
disabling stereotypes.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment, 2 30 public
services, 23 1 and public accommodations. 23 2 When sterilization proceedings originate with the state, they may be characterized as
"public services," and thus may come within the purview of the
statute.
A.

The ADA as a Guide to Policy Implementation

The ADA is an equal opportunity statute; one of its goals is to
set the disabled on equal footing in the eyes of the administrative
state. 23 3 Thus all programs, activities, and services "provided or
made available by State and local governments" may not discriminate on the basis of disability. 23 4 At least one commentator on the
ADA has suggested that its anti-discrimination provisions will be
given a narrow reading by the courts. 23 5 Evidence, however, suggests that key anti-discrimination provisions should be interpreted
as they were written: broadly. One need only examine the Findings
and Purposes section of the Act 23 6 and the relevant legislative history,23 7 as well as the recently promulgated Department of Justice

regulations, 23 8 support such a conclusion. For example, the Congressional Findings and Purposes indicate that:
229
230

Parmet, supra note 227, at 340.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West Supp. 1992).
231
Id. § 12132.
232 Id. § 12181.
233 The Congressional Findings and Purposes section of the ADA states:
Individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities,
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
234 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1991).
235 See Parmet, supra note 227, at 338.
236 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
237 Concluding its report on the need for comprehensive legislation protecting the
rights of the disabled, the House Committee on Education and Labor states:
there is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and for the integration of persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of Americian life... there is a need to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination ....
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50 (1989).
238 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1992) (implementing Title II of the Act).
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the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independant living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
239
individuals .....
Thus the opening provisions of the ADA adopt the enabling
paradigm. The Findings echo the principles of normalization and
integration upon which the Act is premised. Although they do not
have the force of law, congressional findings nevertheless have the
potential to direct policy in the courts. 2 40 These findings enable
courts to make principled enabling decisions in sterilization cases.
B.

Sterilization as Discrimination under Title II of the ADA

One of the most potentially far reaching provisions of the ADA
is Title II, which prohibits discrimination in the administration of
public services by state and local governments. 24 ' The Title II prohibition states that:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 242
This section covers "public entities"-defined as any state or local
government or instrumentality thereof.2 43 This section also protects "qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies]," 24 4 who are defined
as "individual[s] ... with disabilit[ies] who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meet[] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services . . .
24 5
provided by a public entity."
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1992).
240 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 436-37
(1991).
241 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992). For an overview of this provision, see
Burgdorf, supra note 241, at 464-70.
242 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992).
243 The relevant portion of the Act reads:
DEFINITION
as used in this subchapter:
(1) PUBLIC ENTlTY.-The term "public entity" means(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (West Supp. 1992).
244 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1992).
245 The relevant portion of the Act reads:
(2) QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILrrY.-The term
"qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disabilty who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
239
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An examination of the Act raises the question of whether statemandated involuntary sterilization could qualify as an act of discrimination under Title II. The legislative history of the Act and its implementing regulations suggest that it does. The House Committee
on Education and Labor's report on the ADA explicitly mentions
involuntary sterilization as an area of continuing discrimination:
"[discrimination] persists in such critical areas as education, employment, institutionalization, medical treatment, involuntary sterilization, architectural barriers and transportation." 246
In addition, the House Committee's report sets forth a few clear
examples of discrimination, which include the refusal of a New
Jersey zoo keeper to admit children with Down's Syndrome because
he "feared they would upset the chimpanzees," 24 7 and the exclusion
of an academically competitive cerebral palsied child from public
school because "his teacher claimed his physical appearance 'produced a nauseating effect' on his classmates. ' 248 The crucial elements of discrimination in these examples involve differentiation
made solely on the basis of disability without adequate justification.
The disabled are thereby dehumanized, as their desires and needs
are sacrificed either to satisfy society's intangible aesthetic needs or
to placate its irrational fears.
Any action by a public entity that creates an unnecessary or unjustified distinction between disabled persons and others on the basis of disability which thereby denies the disabled the opportunity to
receive equal treatment in the provision of services should' constitute discrimination under Title 11.249 The inquiry should address
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id. § 12131.
246 H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 237, at 31 (quoting U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Accomodating the Spectrum of IndividualAbilities).
247 Id. at 30.
248

Id.

249

See H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 237, at 29-30

(Discrimination against people with disabilities includes segregation,
exclusion, or other denial of benefits, services or opportunities to people
with disabilities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to
others... [it] also includes adverse actions taken against those regarded
by others as having a disability . . . [s]uch discrimination often results

from false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies.);
see also Martha T. McCluskey, Note, Rethinking Equality and Diference: Disability Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 YALE LJ. 863, 878-79 (1988)
(Disability discrimination doctrine should confront the prejudice that
makes the "differences" related to disability seem like abnormal, separate
problems that are necessarily disadvantageous. Instead of approving special, segregated services, courts and policymakers should follow the dis-
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the relation between the decision to differentiate and the actual ca250
pabilities of the disabled person.
Under the above analysis, involuntary eugenic sterilization statutes, such as Mississippi's, 2 5 1 fall within this proposed statutory definition of discrimination. By allowing the decisionmaker to single
out the mentally disabled on the premise that they are "by the laws
of heredity.., the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring," 2 52 the Mississippi statute allows invidious stereotypes
and overbroad generalizations to enter into the sterilization decision. When a legislature authorizes sterilization because it is in society's best interests to minimize the possibility of "socially
inadequate" citizens, the situation is fundamentally the same as a
school board's decision to deny a cerebral palsied child an education because it is in the "best interests" of the student body not to
be distracted by the "nauseating" disabilities of others. In both
cases, the decision to differentiate is made solely on the basis of society's reaction to the disability, without regard to the capabilities of
2 53
the persons being differentiated.
The Department ofJustice regulations that implement the Act
suggest that involuntary sterilization is within the regulatory ambit
of Title II. The regulations provide:
A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not
directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,
on the basis of disability ...[p]rovide different or seperate aids,
benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities or to any class
of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others unless
such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with ...services that are as effective as those provided to
54
others.2
State-mandated sterilization of the disabled is discriminatory to the
extent that it represents a "different or seperate service" from that
available to persons who are not disabled, unless it is needed to provide the disabled with a service that is as effective as that provided
others. Eugenic sterilization statutes, which are explicitly aimed at
eradicating genetically transmissible mental disabilities, always proparate impact model, which generally requires that unjustified policies
with harmful effects be changed as a whole, rather than remedied
through separate policies targeted at the adversely affected groups.).
250
See 28 G.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, Preamble to Regulation on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Service, 440 (1992) ("The starting point is to question
whether the seperate program is in fact necessary or appropriate for the individual.").
251
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1-41, 45-19, discussed supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
252 Id. § 41-45-9.
253
See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 237, at 30.
254
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1992).
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vide a "different" service without regard to the effectiveness of
state-sponsored sterilizations provided to others. In this manner,
eugenic sterilization statutes are always discriminatory under these
regulations. The only limiting factor on this provision operates
when sterilization is part of a state-run or state-funded program
available to all citizens.
For example, if Maine sponsored a planned parenthood program enabling eligible participants to obtain state-funded sterilizations at a public hospital, the standards by which the sterilizations
were administered would have to comply with the above provision.
Under the Maine sterilization act, all citizens must first give informed consent before being sterilized.255 Persons whose ability to
consent is questionable, which in most cases will be persons who fall
under the ADA's definition of mentally disabled, are required to undergo a special hearing to determine their ability to consent; 25 6 they

are thereby provided with a "different service" under the above regulations. This service, however, is permissible because it is intended
to identify those mentally disabled persons who are capable of informed consent so that they may obtain a sterilization if they so desire. Those mentally disabled persons capable of informed consent
are "qualified" persons whose ability to consent enables them to
benefit from sterilization procedures on equal footing with the general population.
The Preamble to the Department of Justice Regulations offers
further insight into the scope of those duties imposed on public entities by the above provision:
[T]hese provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others .... [P]ublic entities are required to

ensure that their actions are based on facts applicable to individuals and not on presumptions as to what a class of individuals with
25 7
disabilities can or cannot do.

The Preamble goes on to indicate what kind of "facts applicable to
individuals" are relevant. They specify:
The determination [to deny equal participation] . . . must be

based on an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence or on the best available objective evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and
severity of the [health or safety] risk [of allowing equal participa255
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7004. For discussion, see supra notes 166-83 and
accompanying text.
256 Id.
257
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, Preamble to Regulation on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Service, 439 (1992).
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tion]; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur;
and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
2 58
procedures will mitigate the risk.
These regulations, transposed into the context of state-mandated
involuntary sterilizations, suggest that such procedures may be acceptable if guided by an "individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on the best available evidence" that the
failure to sterilize would pose a health risk on a person otherwise
incapable of giving consent. This standard is reminiscent of that
underlying the Maine Due Process in Sterilization Act, 259 which requires a judicial proceeding to determine by clear and convincing
evidence that sterilization is "necessary to preserve the physical and
2 60
mental health" of the non-consenting disabled person.
The determinations required under both statutes are similar
because their underlying assumptions are those of the enabling paradigm. They both seek to maximize the autonomy and self-reliance
of disabled persons by shifting the balance between their "right to
be free from interference" and society's interest in limiting the impact of their disabilities. By adopting principles of normalization,
these statutes alter the legal conception of disability in order to remove its social stigma. One hopes that, if the social experiment envisioned by such legislation succeeds, the co-existence of disabling
and enabling paradigms will be a mere resting place in the evolution
of a more holistic legal approach to disability.
CONCLUSION

Conflicting paradigms of what it means to be disabled-and the
proper measures that society should take concerning those with disabilities-have created conflicting legal conceptions of disability. In
many cases, the law assumes that the mentally disabled are incapable of self-direction, and in these circumstances the law enables
others to act in their behalf. This side of the law is evident in statutes authorizing the non-consensual sterilization of mentally disabled persons. Alternatively, the law seeks to create a sense of
independence and a certain amount of self-sufficiency on the part of
the disabled through statutes that create rights-in the hope that, by
increasing the legal strength of the disabled, such statutes will ultimately alter social expectations and alleviate the impact of disability
on one's potential for a normal life.
Sterilization represents an area of the law that fluctuates between competing interests. Because the decision to sterilize is im258
259
260

Id. at 436.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

Id. § 7013.

tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-7017.
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portant, not only in the personal life of the disabled person but also
as a symbol of the law's fundamental stance towards disability, it
well serves to underscore a basic point: the legal paradigm of disability is changing. Whether this change will have its desired effect of
increasing independence and self-sufficiency among the disabled remains to be seen.
James C. Dugant

t The author would like to thank Kelly Tullier and Jon Grant for their helpful and
constructive comments. Any errors, mistakes, or bald misstatements of the law are of
course my own.

